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ABSTRACT
InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of
such detectors from ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The phenomenon of backflashes, whereby APDs
reemit photons after detecting a photon, gives Eve the opportunity to passively learn the information carried by the detected photon without the
need to actively interact with the legitimate receiver, Bob. While this has been observed in slow-gated detectors, it has not been investigated in
fast-gated APDs where it has been posited that this effect would be lessened. Here, we perform the first experiment to characterize the security
threat that backflashes provide in a GHz-gated self-differencing APD using the metric of information leakage. We find that, indeed, the infor-
mation leakage is lower than that reported for slower-gated detectors, and we show that its effect on the secure key rate is negligible. We also
relate the rate of backflash events to the APD dark current, thereby suggesting that their origin is the InP multiplication region in the APD.
Published under license by AIP Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5140548
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theo-
retic security that is guaranteed by the laws of physics.1 This property
has spurred significant efforts in this research area, culminating in a
number of field trials.2–8 With the recent deployment of QKD outside
of the lab, avalanche photodiodes (APDs) have presented themselves
as the most promising single-photon detectors due to their ability to
operate at room temperature,9 excellent detection efficiency,10 and
short dead-times.11
While perfectly secure in theory, deviations of components from
their ideal behavior can create security loopholes. Detectors are the
most vulnerable devices in a QKD system as they are exposed through
the optical channel and therefore are the most accessible components
to Eve. One example exists in the form of the faked-state attack,12 of
which the most notable implementation is the blinding attack.
Demonstrations of this attack have been presented on a variety of indi-
vidual detectors and systems,13,14 although several of these have only
been possible due to inappropriate operation rather than a genuine
security weakness.15,16
The aforementioned attacks are all examples of Eve actively inter-
acting with the QKD system, both by measuring Alice’s qubits and
then illuminating Bob’s detectors. This presents a significant chance of
their presence being detected. It has been shown that APDs are suscep-
tible to emitting light after detection, known as backflashes.17–21
Backflashes can then allow Eve to act in a more passive way and thus
ascertain which of Bob’s detectors has clicked without having to inter-
act with any components in the QKD system. However, no studies
have yet been performed on fast-gated detectors that are used in state-
of-the-art QKD systems.11 While it has been suggested that faster gat-
ing, resulting in shorter gates and subsequently avalanches with less
charge, would result in fewer backflashes,17 this hypothesis has not
been experimentally verified.
In this paper, we present the first study on backflashes in GHz-
gated self-differencing APDs, key enablers in high bit rate QKD.11 Our
finding supports the hypothesis that faster gating, resulting in nar-
rower gates and smaller avalanche charges, results in fewer back-
flashes. Using the technique in Ref. 17, we quantify the information
leakage and find it to be 0.5%, which is an order of magnitude lower
than the value measured for a MHz-gated detector. Such a low infor-
mation leakage has a negligible effect on the secure key rate.
To determine the potential vulnerability of a fast-gated APD, we
perform a simple experiment. An InGaAs/InP APD is chosen as the
device under test. It is thermoelectrically cooled to 30  C where the
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breakdown voltage is 62.16V. When driven with a constant DC bias
of 59.66V and a peak-to-peak 1GHz AC signal of 10V with 50% duty
cycle corresponding to 500 ps “ON” and “OFF” times, respectively,
the APD exhibits a detection efficiency of 17% at a wavelength of
1550nm, a dark count probability of 1:9 106, and an afterpulse
probability of 5%.
For investigating the effect of backflashes on the security of QKD,
the APD is illuminated with a 1550nm pulsed laser diode (LD) with a
pulse width of approximately 30 ps and a repetition frequency of 1/64
of the APD gating frequency (15.625MHz). We use this laser repeti-
tion frequency to only illuminate every 64th gate as this allows us to
mitigate the addition of afterpulses when determining the number of
legitimate APD counts. If a faster frequency were used, afterpulses
could raise the APD detections and thus artificially lower the informa-
tion leakage. The flux is controlled using a variable optical attenuator
(VOA). We illuminate the APD with 0.1 photons/pulse, a flux typical
for QKD, at the start of the APD gate. The reasons for the placement
of the pulse in this temporal location are twofold. First, this simulates
the behavior of the legitimate users, as the detection efficiency is the
greatest at the start of the gate. Second, placing the pulse at the start of
the gate gives the avalanches the longest time to grow and therefore
provides a maximum value of the backflash probability and is there-
fore the more conservative estimate of information leakage. The light
enters port 1 of a circulator, and port 2 is connected to the APD.
Emitted backflashes then re-enter the circular and exit via port 3, after
which they are measured with a superconducting nanowire single-
photon detector (SNSPD). The detected APD counts and backflashes
are interpreted with a time-tagging single-photon counter. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1(a).
In an ideal case, any light detected by the SNSPDs can be attrib-
uted to backflashes. However, in the optical path, backreflections are
also detected and can artificially raise the SNSPD count rate. An exam-
ple of this is shown in the histogram of SNSPD detection events with
the APD DC and AC disabled (see red bars in Fig. 1(b)). The peak fea-
tures at approximately 17 and 49ns can be attributed to backreflec-
tions from the APD surface and connector between the APD and
circulator, and they dominate the SNSPD detection events when the
APD is single-photon insensitive, shown as the red bars in the same
figure. The blue bars corresponding to backflashes are reasonably uni-
formly distributed across the histogram, with the exception of the sec-
ond backreflected peak. At this point of approximately 49 ns, the blue
bars have a much larger amplitude (around 100 rather than 40), which
suggests that this peak corresponds to reflection from the APD surface
itself and that the backflashes are strongly correlated with APD detec-
tion events.
To quantify the effect of backflashes on QKD security, we use the





whereNB is the number of detected backflashes (neglecting backreflec-
tions and dark counts), NA is the number of detected valid APD
counts (i.e., neglecting dark counts), gdet is the detection efficiency of
the monitoring detector (80% for the SNSPD used), and gch is the
channel loss between the APD under test and the monitoring detector,
measured to be 0.78.
In order to obtain a true measure of the information leakage, it
was necessary to isolate the backreflections. A simple technique for
this is simply to neglect them in post processing. This was done by
subtracting the SNSPD histogram with the APD turned off so that
only backflashes were measured, shown in Fig. 1(c). This large peak
also at around 49ns supports the hypothesis given above that the
backflashes are correlated with APD clicks. Measurements were per-
formed for different detection efficiencies by varying the DC bias to
the APD, and the subsequent information leakage was then calculated
and is plotted as a function of detection efficiency in Fig. 2 alongside
the value measured in Ref. 17 for the ID 201 detector. The APD detec-
tion efficiency was determined at each point using the technique out-
lined in Ref. 22.
The data appear initially very noisy at low efficiency. This is due
to the SNSPD count rate being similar to its dark count rate, which
suggests that the rate of backflashes is very low. We note that it was
not possible to extend the measurement time to smooth out the statis-
tics due to the instability of the APD’s temperature over time. The
data then appear much smoother from an efficiency of 10% as the rate
of backflashes increases. As the information leakage remains more or
less constant from then on, this suggests that the relationship between
backflashes and APD counts is linear. By comparing this to the ID 201
detector, we see an order of magnitude improvement in the informa-
tion leakage, which supports the hypothesis that shorter gates will emit
fewer backflashes.
FIG. 1. (a) Schematic of the experiment used to investigate APD backflashes. LD:
laser diode, VOA: variable optical attenuator, SNSPD: superconducting nanowire
single-photon detector, and TCSPC: time-correlated single-photon counter. (b)
Histograms of the detection events on the SNSPD when the APD is illuminated
with a 0.1 photons/pulse where the total measurement time is 10 s. The x-axis
refers to the effective delay with respect to the laser trigger pulse. The APD is
biased under two different DC biases: single photon sensitive (blue bars) and single
photon insensitive (red bars). (c) Subtracted histogram with backreflections
removed, leaving only backflashes.
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Using the value for information leakage, which is a direct mea-
surement of Eve’s information, we can derive a new secure key rate in
the presence of backflashes. This has been partially investigated in Ref.
18 where the authors approach the derivation of the key rate from a
photon number splitting perspective and treat the information leakage
as “tagged” bits but originating from Bob rather than Alice.23,24
However, the authors in Ref. 18 assume that the backflash probability,
and therefore information leakage, remains constant over all distances,
which means that they obtain a very pessimistic estimate for the secure
key rate. This is because they use the conditional backflash probability
(i.e., the probability of a backflash if there is an APD click), whereas
the raw, absolute backflash probability would have been more appro-
priate. In reality, as the information leakage is dependent on an APD
click, the APD click probability should also be incorporated into this
analysis so that the key rate is affected by the same proportion, regard-
less of the distance. We use a modified version of the key rate given in
Ref. 18 considering single-photon BB84 as follows:





where q is the basis choice probability, Pclick is the probability of a click
on a detector, PL is the information leakage [defined in Eq. (1)], h(x) is
the binary Shannon entropy, e is the quantum bit error rate, and f is
the error correction efficiency. It is interesting to note that by simply
multiplying the information leakage term by the click probability in
the key rate definition from Ref. 18, thereby including a dependence of
the backflash probability on the APD detection probability, the equa-
tion reduces to Eq. (2).
Using detector characteristics from this study, we plot the key
rate as a function of the distance for several values of information leak-
age, namely, zero, 5 102, which was the previous state-of-the-art,
and 5 103, as measured in our own setup, as shown in Fig. 3.
As an information leakage of 0.5% has a negligible effect on the
key rate, an isolator would not be needed as a countermeasure since
even with a very low insertion loss of 0.2 dB, it would have a greater
impact on the key rate. This result provides strong evidence that back-
flashes are not a significant threat to QKD, even for slower gated
detectors where the information leakage is potentially larger. We note,
however, that characterizing the spectrum of the backflashes is also
important for enforcing this point in order to more accurately deter-
mine the information leakage. While this has been partially explored
in previous studies,18–20 these have not corrected for the spectral
response of the measurement apparatus. We believe that this is an
important avenue for future work, not only from a security perspective
but also to shed light on the precise origin of backflashes within APDs.
While we have shown that backflashes have a small effect on the
secure key rate, they can still pose a security risk. As shown in Ref. 17,
the temporal profile of backflashes appears to be unique for different
APDs. This can provide Eve with information on the detectors used
by Bob, allowing her to use a tailored attack that is dependent on the
type of APD in Bob’s system. Therefore, the use of an isolate may still
be desirable as a countermeasure.
As a second experiment to probe the origin of the APD back-
flashes, we switch off the laser and measure the backflashes with the
APD kept under dark conditions. We measure the SNSPD count rate
FIG. 3. Secure key rate plotted in the absence of backflashes, with the measured
information leakage and previous state-of-the-art. Even with PL ¼ 6%, the effect on
the key rate is negligible, as the term PL gives the exact amount by which the key
rate is reduced.
FIG. 4. SNSPD count rate as a function of APD dark current. The linear relationship
between the two strongly points to backflashes originating in the InP multiplication
region.
FIG. 2. Information leakage plotted as a function of the APD single-photon detec-
tion efficiency. The red star indicates the corresponding information leakage for a
commercially available APD, ID 201, reported in the literature.17 The detector under
test exhibits an order of magnitude smaller than information leakage, supporting the
hypothesis that faster-gated APDs emit fewer backflashes.
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as a function of the APD dark current by adjusting the DC bias to the
APD. The result is given in Fig. 4.
Initially, the SNSPD count rate remains at the dark count level
until the APD current reaches a value of approximately 10nA. After
about 100nA, the data appear to follow a linear trend, and this is con-
firmed by fitting the data points. This finding supports the hypothesis
that backflashes arise from carriers in the multiplication region; a higher
dark current arises from the larger electric field increasing the avalanche
probability, thereby generating more carriers, which cause backflashes.
In conclusion, we have investigated backflashes in GHz-gated
self-differencing InGaAs APDs. By performing the first characteriza-
tion of the backflash rate in these devices using high efficiency
SNSPDs, we have found evidence that supports the hypothesis that
shorter gates lead to fewer backflashes. We have shown that the infor-
mation leakage as a result of backflashes has a negligible effect on the
secure key rate in QKD and is, as such, of minimal concern in QKD
systems. We have performed characterization, which indicates that
backflashes originate in the detector’s InP multiplication region.
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